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The practice of teaching and writing in the field of criminal law has
changed dramatically in the last half-century. In the United States and
England, and to a lesser extent in other English-speaking countries, we
have witnessed a turn toward theoretical inquires of a greater depth and
variety than had existed previously in the history of Anglo-American law.
The subjects of this new literature include the nature and rationale of pun-
ishment;' the theory of justification and of excuse, that is, of wrongdoing
and responsibility;2 the relevance of consequences to the gravity of
offenses (the problem of moral luck);3 and the proper structuring of spe-
cific fields of law, notably the law of homicide, particularly at the begin-
ning and the end of life,4 of rape.' and of victimless offenses that result in
Copyright © 2000 George P. Fletcher. The editors have been unable to verify the foreign sources
contained in this Essay. The author is therefore entirely responsible for their accuracy.
* Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence, Columbia University School of Law.
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6no material harm to other persons. As far as the United States goes, the
roots of this flowering lie in the classic article by Jerome Michael and
Herbert Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide.' The casebook by
the same authors provided the first serious teaching tool for a reflective and
systematic approach to American criminal law! The Model Penal Code, a
project initiated by Herbert Wechsler and the American Law Institute in
the 1950s, brought together many of the most serious legal minds of the
generation to work out, for the first time, the rules and principles that
would constitute the general part of American criminal law, namely the
rules and principles that would be applicable to all offenses.' And signifi-
cantly, the 1962 publication of the first edition of the novel, theoretically-
minded casebook by Sanford Kadish and Monrad Paulsen"° helped to cre-
ate a community of scholars who read the same cases and followed up on
the same set of citations to the journals and law reviews.
There were certainly historical precursors to this burst of theoretical
inquiry. Stephen," Mill, 2 Bentham, 13 and Blackston 4 come readily to
mind. One of the most famous maxims of the theoretical criminal law-
actus not facit reus nisi mens sit rea'--dates back to Edward Coke's for-
mulation in the early seventeenth century. 6 Yet this earlier legal literature
consists largely in apodictic statements about how the criminal law should
be formulated. It lacks the reflective attention to issues that we have come
to associate with philosophical inquiry.
In trying to understand the nature and function of this theoretical
work, the term "philosophy" is the first descriptive word to come to mind.
5. See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987); E. M. Curley, Excusing Rape, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
325 (1976); Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986).
6. See PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965); H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY
AND MORALITY (1963); Sanford H. Kadish, More on Overcriminalization: A Reply to Professor
Junker, 19 UCLA L. REV. 719 (1972); Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 157 (1967).
7. Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide: 1, 37 COLUM. L.
REv. 701 (1937) [hereinafter Wechsler & Michael 1]; Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A
Rationale of the Law of Homicide: 11, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 1261 (1937) [hereinafter Wechsler &
Michael III.
8. See JEROME MICHAEL & HERBERT WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION
(1940).
9. See MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
10. See MONRAD G. PAULSEN & SANFORD H. KADISH, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES
(1962).
11. See JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND (1883).
12. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 22 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books 1985)
(1859).
13. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION (J.L. Bums & H.L.A. Hart ed., Clarendon Press 1996) (1823).
14. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND (1765).
15. Literally translated: "The act is not criminal unless the mind is criminal."




Indeed, without the devoted interest of a group of philosophers in the
1950s and 1960s, it is doubtful that the field would have taken off. The
philosophical analogue to Herbert Wechsler was H.L.A. Hart, who, as
teacher and scholar, brought the methods of analytic philosophy to bear on
the study of criminal law. Herbert Morris, 7 Joel Feinberg, 8 Robert
Nozick, Judith Jarvis Thomson, 0 and many others deepened this interde-
pendency of law and philosophy. These philosophers were building on a
long tradition dating back, on some issues, to Aquinas and even to
Aristotle. Yet the major debates in the philosophical reflection on the
criminal law have a distinctively modern ring to them. Established
authorities have been punishing criminals from the beginning of organized
society, but it is not until the late eighteenth century that we find serious
engagement and disagreement about the purposes of inflicting this harm on
those who have transgressed the norms of the community. Today, we take
the debate between Kant's retributivism and Bentham's utilitarianism to be
paradigmatic of the style of intellectual confrontation that has induced
philosophical reflection on every factor bearing on the question whether
we should punish a particular individual on a particular occasion.
At this juncture, on this occasion honoring one of the founders of the
field, it might be appropriate to pause and reflect on the nature and the
function of this shared inquiry into the foundations of the substantive
criminal law. Criminal theory has clearly come of age, and therefore it can
endure this Essay, written as a critical assessment both of its promise and
its shortcomings.
I
WHAT KIND OF INQUIRY IS CRIMINAL THEORY?
The field of criminal theory should be thought of more as a humanist
inquiry than as a social science. The questions that concern us are not
empirical. The task is not to explain how the system actually works. Of
course, it is important to know, for example, how the police function, how
juries decide, how the system effects minorities, and so on. So far as other
researchers can inform us of these facts of life, we should take note. This is
not, however, the essence of the theoretical enterprise.
To say that the field is a humanist inquiry underscores the great mys-
tery of the human condition that comes into focus in criminal trials. How is
it that human beings can commit heinous acts, and how can we justify
17. See Morris, supra note 1.
18. See FEINBERG, supra note 3; JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
(1984) [hereinafter FEINBERO, MORAL LIMITS].
19. See ROBERT NoZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974) [hereinafter NozIci4
ANARCHY]; ROBERT NoZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS (1981).
20. See JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK: ESSAYS IN MORAL THEORY
(William Parent ed., 1986).
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blaming and punishing them for having committed them? The first part of
this question stresses the issues of individual guilt and punishment and
connects readily to moral philosophy. The second part, regarding collective
blaming and state punishment, raises a question of political philoso-
phy: When should the state be able to act in the common good by impos-
ing sanctions against particular individuals? As criminal theory lies at the
union of law and philosophy, it also defines an intersection between moral
and political philosophy.
These two points of intersection require further reflection. First, how
do law and philosophy impose competing perspectives on theoretical work
in criminal law? And second, how do moral and political philosophy differ
in their concerns and procedures?
A. The Differing Demands of Law and Philosophy
Law and philosophy are in fact two entirely different kinds of inquiry,
and the difference between them is captured in the word "authority." Legal
studies proceed by reflecting on the meaning and extension of certain
authoritative texts-constitutions, statutes, regulations, and case holdings.
This deference to authoritative rules and prescriptions runs contrary to the
philosophical method, which involves searching for the best reasons to
defend a particular position. Law tends toward the parochial, for authority
is always limited to a particular time and place. If you are thinking about
self-defense and the duty to retreat in the United States, you pay attention
to American authorities. If you are thinking about self-defense in Germany,
you heed the local statutory and case law and scholarly prescriptions about
self-defense. By contrast, philosophy represents a universal inquiry inde-
pendent of time and place. No one is constituted as the authority to pre-
scribe certain sources as the ones you must read and think about.2' In doing
legal theory, it is a mistake to ignore the local criminal code; but if you do
not find Hegel illuminating, it is not a "mistake" in a philosophical inquiry
simply to ignore him.
Admittedly, in the United States, we enjoy a certain tendency toward
universalist thinking that is not shared by our colleagues in Germany,
France, and Italy. If you live and teach in California, you are not limited in
your horizons to the California Criminal Code and the California cases.
Indeed, these materials have no privileged position in any of the great
casebooks, such as the book by Kadish and Paulsen, now transformed into
Kadish and Schulhofer.12 Cases from New Zealand are just as important as
those from the court down the street, and Stephen's draft code for India
21. For more in this vein, see George P. Fletcher, What Law is Like, 50 SMU L. REV. 1599
(1997).




carries weight, as does the Model Penal Code. The degree of parochial
thinking outside the English-speaking world is much stronger. French
writing on criminal law reveals little knowledge about legal sources out-
side of France, and the Germans, who know more about law abroad, still
write and teach as though the authoritative German materials define their
universe of inquiry.
In the end, however, the difference between the English-speaking
world, or "common law system," and the rest of the world is simply a
matter of degree. A large number of Anglophone countries share the same
language and take cognizance of each others' legal sources, but the
boundaries of parochial thinking become clear sooner or later. English-
speaking lawyers do not recognize the relevance of legal authorities written
in other languages. They might be curious about odd things done in one
country or another, but they do not take "foreign" statutes or cases seri-
ously as authorities that constrain their thinking.
This parochial thinking runs afoul of the philosophical temper. There
is nothing about philosophy written in English that makes it intrinsically
more appealing than works originally published in Greek, Latin, or
German. Indeed, it is not clear why in philosophical inquiries one cares at
all about what philosophers in the past have said. Philosophy is not the
history of philosophy, as my teacher Norman Malcolm used to preach. Yet
teachers of philosophy do in fact concentrate on reading and explicating
the "greats" as though their work commanded some authority on the prob-
lems they raise. Perhaps there is a need to start somewhere, and those who
have brought wisdom to bear in the past warrant the honor of having the
first, if not necessarily the last, word in the discussion.
The danger in legal studies is to treat jurists of the past, who were of-
ten rather pedestrian thinkers, as having the last word in determining what
the law is. We read their constitutions, statutes, and case opinions as
though they actually solved the problem they were addressing. We do this
for various reasons. Their words acquire authority by virtue of the political
system that we are willing to live by or, in the case of constitutions,
because they lived and wrote at particularly poignant moments in history,
such as the concluding hours of a political revolution.
One is tempted to draw an analogy between the reliance of lawyers on
their parochial sources of law and the invocation of God's recorded word
in a religious community. The culture of the law is, in fact, much like the
culture of religious belief. Both start with the text. But a sophisticated
practitioner of either law or religion will always seek to go beyond the text
and bring to bear the insights of reason on the ultimate issues at hand. The-
ology, when it is done well, resembles the informed groping of legal theo-
rists trying to bring diverse sources to bear on the ineffable problems of
action, responsibility, guilt, and justified punishment. Great religious
2000]
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thinkers like Maimonides and Aquinas never limited themselves to the
sources of revelation. Great legal minds proceed in a similar way: They
take their traditions seriously (the analogue to revelation) and move
beyond them in the direction of universal answers based on the kinds of
reasoning that could appeal to thinking people everywhere.
The appeal of the analogy between theology and legal thought is that
it accounts for the parochial nature of legal studies. The loyalty that law-
yers show to their local constitutions, statutes, and cases is quite remark-
able and can only be understood as the expression of a culture of faith. At
some level Americans must believe that those fifty-five white men who
met in Philadelphia in the sweltering summer of 1787 really got it right. At
least they believe it in a way that Europeans and Chinese hardly share.
These commitments to belief resemble the socialized instincts of members
of religious communities. They take their own holy texts seriously and
totally ignore, if not attack, the texts of neighboring cultures.
Scholars who seek to work on the philosophical foundations of crimi-
nal responsibility, then, are caught between the forces of competing disci-
plines. The customs of legal scholarship drive theorists toward taking the
indigenous "sources of law" seriously, treating them as the authoritative
basis for solving problems. The traditions of philosophy generate an
impulse toward universalist arguments based on sources available to all.
This conflict comes to the fore in assessing the relevance of particular
decisions by the courts or legislatures. Suppose that the local law givers
have decided that strict liability is acceptable in rape cases, that conse-
quences matter in assessing the gravity of punishment, that felony-murder
is a permissible doctrine, or that the insanity defense is indispensable in a
proper assessment of criminal responsibility. Why should the theorist care
about these purely parochial decisions? Of course, they should matter if the
theorist has sound reasons for thinking that the decisions are right. But the
fact that some judge somewhere made a certain decision hardly generates a
sound reason in itself for taking the decision to be authoritative.
The problem becomes more difficult if we can detect a pattern of
decisions and principles that cuts across legal systems and constitutes a
nearly universal practice. A good example is the relevance of conse-
quences to determining the gravity of an offense and the severity of pun-
ishment. Virtually all legal systems in the world punish completed offenses
more severely than they punish attempts. Harm matters-at least in the
way the vast majority of lawyers and judges think about things. Yet a con-
siderable body of theory has developed to the effect that under a proper
analysis of culpability, consequences should be regarded as purely arbi-
trary and therefore irrelevant to the actor's criminal responsibility. 3
An actor, malicious to his core, may shoot to kill, but for purely physical
23. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 3.
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reasons the bullet may not strike home. The argument is that this blame-
worthy actor is just as culpable as one who succeeds in his intentions. This
argument is sufficient to turn some distinguished minds, including Joel
Feinberg and Sandy Kadish, to the view that last-step attempts (where
there is nothing more the actor can do) should be punished just as severely
as actions that actually succeed and result in irreversible harm.24
Here is an example of practice, in conflict with theory, and the ques-
tion is how to proceed. Is there a rule of thumb telling us whether to favor
theory over practice? Alas, no. It all depends on the practice and on the
theory. In this particular case, I happen to think the theoretical arguments
are wrongly conceived and developed (as I will show later), and the prac-
tice should constitute the basis of our philosophical inquiry. The question
should not be whether the nearly universal practice is right, but why it is
right. Here I rely on a point of philosophical psychology that I learned
from my mentor Herbert Morris: When an intuition is deeply held, the task
of theory should be to generate convincing arguments that those who hold
the intuition may not be able to articulate themselves.
The problem with this view is that some widespread practices are
clearly wrong, or at least inconsistent with other basic principles of the
criminal law. Perhaps there are many people who would claim that the
felony-murder rule represents a deeply held intuition. Yet the general the-
ory of culpability holds that actors should be held responsible for the con-
sequences of their actions only to the extent that they are culpable in
generating those consequences. Culpability is determined by considera-
tions such as whether the actor intended the consequences; whether she
acted knowingly, recklessly, or negligently with respect to the risk of the
consequence; and whether she is excused or partially excused for her
actions. An offender who accidentally kills someone in the course of a
robbery is not, without further proof, culpable for the homicide. Yet the
felony-murder rule in effect presumes culpability with respect to the result,
in violation both of the requirement of culpability and the presumption of
innocence. Again, there is conflict between practice and theory. Should the
theorist apply the Morris maxim and seek to defend the felony-murder rule
as a deeply held intuition of common people, just like the judgment about
the relevance of consequences to punishment?
My answer is: clearly not. But now we face a serious problem of
methodology. How do we decide when to take the practices of the legal
system seriously and when not? Here are a few suggestions about how to
proceed in thinking through this matter.
First we have to clarify whose intuitions we are talking about. Do we
mean the intuitions of the man,- woman, and child on the street? Do we
24. See FEINBERG, supra note 3; Kadish, supra note 3.
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follow the results of the interesting study by Robinson and Darby' on the
intuitions of common people about the conundrums of the type we have
been discussing? Or do we mean the educated intuitions of lawyers and
judges-people trained and perhaps "corrupted" by the criteria of legal
analysis? I would not be at all surprised if the guy in the street were to
favor both (a) treating consequences as irrelevant to the punishment of the
person who acted with evil intent and (b) blaming the robber for the
homicide that his criminal action accidentally brings about. But so what?
A refinement of our intuitions takes place when we work on the casuistic
problems of legal analysis. It seems to be more sensible to rely upon
the intuitions of actors in the actor culture. But then comes the response:
They, like the guy in the street, seem to favor the felony-murder rule.
At this juncture in the argument, comparative law becomes acutely
relevant. If a practice is widespread among legal systems, there is good
reason to think that it reflects an intuition that we should credit and seek to
justify. If, on the other hand, the United States is isolated in its practice, we
should have second thoughts about taking our local and parochial judg-
ments seriously. In the case of the felony-murder rule, it is difficult to find
a jurisdiction outside the United States-even in the English-speaking
world-that still applies the rule. Also relevant, it seems to me, is the
strength of the opposition to the parochial position of the United States.
The Canadian Supreme Court has declared various aspects of the felony-
murder rule unconstitutional.26 One could expect a similar decision in
Germany and Italy; if they had the rule, their courts would probably find it
to be in violation of their constitutional requirement of culpability as a
condition for criminal responsibility.'
Of course, American politicians and policy makers are notoriously
indifferent to the attitudes of jurists beyond our borders. Witness our per-
sistent faith in capital punishment despite the deliberate killing of offenders
having been discredited every other place in the civilized world. But politi-
cians' parochial attitudes provide no excuse for scholars of criminal theory
to remain indifferent to the patterns that have emerged in Western juris-
prudence. Our perspective should reach wider than our language and
deeper than our supposedly shared debt to the English common law.
I am not arguing that the theorist should submit to every worldwide
trend. Sometimes trends are wrong. A good example, in my opinion, is the
widespread tendency toward punishing impossible attempts, a trend that
has become manifest in the last few decades in England, the United States,
25. See PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY AND BLAME: COMMUNITY
VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1997).
26. See R. v. Martineau [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633.
27. See GONTHER JAKOBS, STRAFRECHT ALLGEMEINER TEIL 470-75 (2d ed. 1993); 1 CLAUS
RoxIN, STRAFRECHT ALLGEMEINER TEIL § 19 (3d ed. 1997); Corte cost., 23-24 mar. 1988, available in
31 REViSTA ITALIANA DI DIRrro E PROCEDURA PENALE 686 (1988).
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and Germany. The argument is that if the actor intends to commit a crime
and engages in a serious effort to execute his intention, there is no reason
to give him the benefit of the circumstances turning out to be different
from what he expected. Yet there are also counterindications in the legal
thought of the industrialized world. Japan and Italy have always held out
against the intent-based, subjective theory.28 Spain has recently joined the
ranks of European countries favoring the countertrend.29 When the nations
of the world are so clearly divided, we have to probe the arguments for and
against more deeply. The trend means very little if it is not in keeping with
the best arguments available for and against criminal liability.
The problem is: How do we evaluate the arguments bearing on
criminal responsibility? If we have a conflict between theory and practice,
we should be very sure that our theoretical or philosophical arguments
are well-grounded. If the arguments invoke the "authority" of Kant or
Aristotle, then we should be sure that we have read these supposed
authorities correctly. My favorite example of philosophical misreading is
the attempt to invoke Kant's theory of the goodwill in morality to support a
concentrated focus on criminal intention as the basis of criminal liability.
Kant argued that a goodwill-as he understood that term-was essential to
the claim that an act had moral value.3" He never argued that a bad will
rendered an action evil. Yet we find recurrent efforts in criminal theory to
adapt Kant's thinking to support, for example, the view that consequences
should not matter in assessing the gravity of the offense?' The argument-
to the extent that it can be articulated-would run as follows:
A: A goodwill is necessary for an action to be good.
B: A goodwill implies a good intention. Therefore a good
intention renders an action good.
C: A bad will implies a bad intention and a bad intention renders
an action evil.
D: If the intention is sufficient to make an act good or evil, then
the consequences are irrelevant to determining the good or
evil represented by the action.
If these inferences, from A to B, B to C, and C to D, were correct,
Kantian theory might provide some support for the view that the core of
the criminal law consists in evil intentions and that consequences should be
28. See CODICE PENALE [C.P.] § 49(2) (Italy); see also SHIGEMITSU DANDO, THE CRIMINAL LAW
OF JAPAN 202-08 (B.J. George trans., 1997); GIOVANNI FIANDACA & ENZO Musco, DiRITTo
PENALE: PARTE GENERALE 430-31 (3d ed. 1995).
29. See C6DIGO PENAL [C.P.] § 16(1) (Spain) (defining attempt to require action that
"objetivamente deberfan producir el resultado" [that would objectively produce the result]).
30. See IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 17-18
(Thomas K. Abbott trans., 1949).
31. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, The Independent Moral Significance of Wrongdoing, 5 J.




irrelevant to assessing just punishment. But apart from the first premise, all
of these inferences are false. Here is a short explanation why:
A: This represents a correct reading of Kant's view as set out in
the first few lines of The Prolegomenon to the Metaphysics of
Morals.32
A to B: In the Kantian system, intention differs fundamentally
from will. Der Wille is defined as the capacity to act without the
influence of sensual stimuli from the external world; it is the
capacity to reflect the dictates of the universal law of reason. 3 That
is why an act can have a moral quality only if it is an expression of
der Wille. It is not true that a good intention, which might be
responsive to sensual stimuli in the world, renders an action good.
There is no reason to think that an intentional act, just because it is
intentional, is a product of der Wille.
B to C: This is probably the biggest fallacy of the set. Under the
Kantian system, good acts and bad acts are asymmetrical; if a
theory applies to the former, it does not necessarily apply to the
latter. For an act to have moral worth it must be autonomous. Bad
acts are, by definition, heteronomous.' They are not products of
der Wille. One cannot autonomously choose to do evil, to commit a
crime. Of course, under Kant's legal theory, we find a lengthy
discussion of crime and punishment.35 But Kant explicitly describes
the seat of criminal conduct as die WillkUr (heteronomous arbitrary
choice) rather than der Wille (autonomous choice based on
reason).36
C to D: In his extensive discussion of criminal actions, Kant
ignores the problem of attempts and inchoate acts. All the examples
given are those based on consummated actions. The conclusion that
consequences are foreign to the Kantian way of thinking about
crime and punishment represents a total perversion of Kantian
thought.
Despite all of these errors, this misreading of Kant has won the loy-
alty of some sophisticated thinkers.37 It is one of the primary props of the
supposedly theoretical argument in favor of punishing attempted offenses
at the same level as consummated offenses. Perhaps lawyers are naturally
drawn to the citation of philosophical authority; it is a professional vice.
32. KANT, supra note 30, at 11.
33. See IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 11 (Lewis White
Beck trans., 1959) (1785); see also George P. Fletcher, Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective, 87
COLUM. L. REv. 533 (1987).
34. See id at 537.
35. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE (John Ladd trans., 1985).
36. For a critical assessment of my views on der Wille and die Willkilr, see Peter Benson,
External Freedom According to Kant, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 559, 561-62 (1987).
37. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 48 (1978); Joshua Dressier, New Thoughts
About the Concept of Justification in the Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher's Thinking and
Rethinking, 32 UCLA L. REv. 61, 80 (1984).
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But if the name of one of the great philosophers of modernity comes into
play, one should at least get the reading right.
Writers of legal theory are drawn not only to Kant but to Aristotle.
The Nichomachean Ethics is often cited to support analysis of the theory of
excuses. 8 I think that, by and large, this tracing of excuses to Aristotle is
correct, even though the philosopher was concerned not about criminal
responsibility but about the problem of virtue and the flourishing of indi-
viduals. Though Aristotle has many insights to offer, we should be careful
about relying on an exegesis of his text to decide, for example, whether
negligence is a suitable ground for criminal liability. That was not a prob-
lem to which he addressed his energy.
Apart from relying on these historical "authorities," theorists are left
with few convincing arguments in their arsenal. Michael Moore relies
heavily on intuition," but, as we have noted, we have a serious problem
determining whose intuitions should matter and why. Strict logical argu-
ments are rare in the literature. Recently Russell Christopher has pressed
the avoidance of contradiction as an argument for structuring the theory of
justification' and his work may portend an effort to develop more rigor-
ous arguments for particular outcomes in the theory of criminal responsi-
bility.
As things stand now, our methods of argument are a hodgepodge of
intuition, citations to case law, philosophical references (sometimes laced
with misreading), and, of course, policy arguments about the behavior we
seek to encourage and discourage. There has been and presumably always
will be attention paid to the classic debate between retribution and deter-
rence as the rationale for punishment and, in general, between deontologi-
cal and utilitarian approaches to moral problems. Yet there has not been
enough attention paid to the difference between moral, political, and other
kinds of arguments about the proper approach to criminal law.
B. The Differing Perspectives of Political and Moral Philosophy
Criminal law begins with punishment, and the kind of punishment
with which we are concerned represents an intrusion of the state into the
individuals' freedom. Therefore the first question that must be asked is all
38. See Michael Corrado, Automatism and the Theory of Action, 39 EMORY L.J. 1191 (1990);
John Gardner, The Gist of Excuses, 1 BUFF. CRim. L. REV. 575 (1998); Kyron Huigens, Virtue and
Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1423 (1995).
39. See MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
(1997).
40. See Russell Christopher, Self-Defense and Defense of Others, 27 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 123
(1998); Russell Christopher, Self-Defense and Objectivity: A Reply to Judith Jarvis Thomson, I BUFF.
CRrm. L. REv. 537 (1998); Russell Christopher, Unknowing Justification and the Logical Necessity of
the Dadson Principle in Private Defence, 15 OXF. J. LEG. STUD. 229 (1995); Russell L. Christopher,
Mistake of Fact in the Objective Theory of Justification: Do Two Rights Make Two Wrongs Make Two
Rights... ?, 85 J. CRm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295 (1994).
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too often ignored: What makes it legitimate for the state to make people
suffer? The answer can hardly be, "The state must do justice," or
"Criminals deserve punishment." The preliminary demand is to develop a
theory of the state that legitimates action in pursuit of justice or authorizes
state agents to decide what people deserve and to distribute suffering
accordingly. The range of these theories includes libertarian, liberal, com-
munitarian, utilitarian, and perfectionist theories of the state.
Given the centrality of political legitimacy in the criminal law, one
can only be amazed at the extent to which the question is ignored both in
the philosophical and legal literature. In Joel Feinberg's masterful study of
the limits of the criminal law,4' there is almost no attention paid to political
theory. Our leading liberal philosophers-Rawls, 2 Dworkin,43
Ackerman-have almost nothing of value to add to our understanding of
criminal law. Libertarians such as Nozick do address the problem of
legitimating state action, and indeed punishment is one of their central
concerns.4 Communitarians in the former Soviet Union also had a distinc-
tive take on the phenomenon of crime and the role of the state in educating
"the new person" who would transcend the corruption of bourgeois soci-
ety.4 But apart from the libertarians and the Communists at the extremes,
the vast majority of us are simply unreflective liberals. We are suspicious
of common law crimes and accept at face value Mill's principle that the
state should punish only to prevent harm,47 and we take these two positions
to be an adequate theoretical foundation for our work.
Perhaps the greatest theoretical tension in the literature derives from
the simultaneous sympathy for certain liberal maxims and a commitment to
retributive punishment. Liberals are supposed to believe that it is not the
business of the state to try to formulate and act upon ultimate principles of
justice; the state cannot purport to do God's work on earth. If that is true, it
is hard to understand how the state can hold to a liberal epistemology and
yet seek to right the "natural order" by punishing those who deserve it.
Despite the great attention devoted to "desert" and retributive theory in
recent years, no one has advanced a systematic argument about the politi-
cal presuppositions of the state legitimately punishing offenders in the
name of ultimate principles of justice. This, of course, has become a major
problem in the international arena as well, for retributive impulses to
41. See FEINBERG, MORAL LIMITS, supra note 18.
42. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
43. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
44. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980).
45. See NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 19, at 106-07, 135, 137-40.
46. The movement to educate a new person suitable for life under socialism made the Soviets
particularly hostile to the theory of excuses. See generally HAROLD J. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE
U.S.S.R. (1963).
47. See MILL, supra note 12.
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punish war crimes and crimes against humanity-sometimes dressed
up as an imaginary preventive policy-drive the formation of the new
International Criminal Court.48 I think it is fine for the international com-
munity to believe that it must punish in the name of justice, but at least we
should have some argument about how a diverse community of nations can
claim to know what justice requires, and why it is empowered to prosecute
and punish those who "deserve" punishment.
As far as domestic policies are concerned, the formerly fascist powers
of Europe-namely Germany, Spain, and Italy-seem to be more sensitive
than are we Americans to the demands of liberal or libertarian theory in
practice. Perhaps a society must have had some experience with political
corruption of the criminal law in order to develop strong liberal sensitivi-
ties. The battle against fascistic criminal law has led to certain liberal slo-
gans designed to limit the power of the state over the lives of individuals. It
is worth paying attention to two of these.
1. Criminal Punishment Should Be Imposed for Acts Committed, Not for
Being a Certain Kind of Person.
This proposition is now taken for granted in most Western legal sys-
tems. It is expressed in the U.S. Supreme Court's aversion to status
offenses.49 The German literature has cultivated the point as the distinction
between an act-based criminal law (Tatstrafrecht) and an actor-based
criminal law (Tdterstrafrecht) ° Communitarian criminal law, taken to
extremes in fascist and communist legal systems, has tended to focus on
the whole person, on characteristics of social dangerousness, and on using
the criminal sanction as a medium of social reeducation. Liberal regimes
stress the limited focus of the criminal sanction; it must be imposed solely
for acts, not for the crime of being different. It is worth noting that this
limitation differs radically from some moral perspectives, particularly from
an Aristotelian concern with virtue. Virtue theory focuses on character as it
develops over time. Individual acts are important only so far as they reveal
character and tend to develop a better or worse character in the future. We
praise and condemn people for the kinds of character they have developed,
but this perspective is not compatible with the deliberate limitation of
criminal punishment to the condemnation of actions.
If American theories were more sensitive to the political dangers of an
actor-based criminal law, we would be quick to criticize arguments based
on the supposed dangerousness of certain types of offenders. We would
48. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Preamble, in 37 INT. LEGAL
MATERIALS 999 (1998).
49. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
50. See Theodor Lenckner, Commentary, inADOLF SCH6NKE & HORST SCHR6DER,
STRAFGESETZBUCH: KOMMENTAR § 13 preliminary remarks, at 173-74 (25th ed. 1997).
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have more trouble with increasing punishment for recidivists (and certainly
with the policy of "three strikes and you're out") and with punishing
impossible attempts on the ground that the mistaken actor is dangerous and
likely to succeed next time. Yet it is very clear that American criminal
theorists today are willing to accept certain actor-based arguments such as
dangerousness inferred from past actions.5 And despite their lip service to
liberal principles, German scholars have virtually no qualms about impos-
ing liability for impossible attempts.52 This is fairly good proof that crimi-
nal theory seems to function today as a potpourri of political theory.
Everyone seems to pick and choose from liberal, communitarian, utilitar-
ian, and perfectionist assumptions as the choice suits their immediate pur-
poses. But the task of the theorist should ideally be first to work out a
political theory and then explore the implications of that political theory in
the details of the criminal law.
2. The Criminal Law Should Serve as the Last Resort (Ultimo Ratio). It
Should Be Invoked Only if All Other Sanctions Fail.
This additional principle for restricting the power of the state flies in
the face of those, like Moore, who take retributivism so seriously that they
think that the state has an absolute duty to punish all those who deserve it 3
A more restrictive theory of legitimate punishment would hold that the
state must first seek to solve the problem of apparent crime by invoking
less drastic remedies. For environmental offenses, corporate crime, embez-
zlement, and crimes of negligence, it might be sufficient to rely on the very
effective American tort system. The fact that conduct is harmful and mor-
ally wrong hardly suffices to conclude that it must be treated as a punish-
able wrong under the criminal law. Tort liability, fueled by eager,
contingency-fee-motivated private lawyers, might do the job just fine.
However one comes out on this question, we cannot but recognize the
issue at stake, namely: What is the general theory of the state, and how
should it be applied to solve social problems?
My plea, then, is for criminal theorists to pay more attention to politi-
cal as well as moral philosophy. The political theory we choose will
invariably shape our answers to innumerable questions about what should
be punished, when nominal violations are justified, and when wrongdoing
should be excused.
51. See, e.g., Wechsler & Michael I, supra note 7, at 757; Wechsler & Michael II, supra note 7,
at 1272.
52. See Strafgetsetzbuch [StGB] § 22 (F.R.G.). This legislated acceptance of the subjective
theory of attempts find general endorsement in the literature. See, e.g., Albin Eser, Commentary, in
ADOLF SCH6NKE & HORST SCHR6DER, STRAFGESETZBUCH: KOMMENTAR § 22, at 340-57 (25th ed.
1997).




WHAT IS THE FUNCTION OF CRIMINAL THEORY?
Much of the work done in criminal theory is really not about issues
that could be classified as philosophical in the traditional sense. The func-
tion of much "theoretical" work in law is to probe the basic concepts that
bear on legal analysis, order these concepts in some kind of structure, and
elaborate the values and principles that lie behind the structure of liability.
That is, the theorist takes the details of the criminal law as more or less
given and tries to elicit from these details some synthetic principles. Con-
sider, for example, the famous maxim formulated by Lord Coke in the
early seventeenth century: Actus not facit reus nisi mens sit rea.4 Liter-
ally, this means that "the act is not criminal unless the mind is criminal."
This is not a philosophical truth based on reason, but rather a synthetic
claim about the criminal law as Coke observed it in practice. Every pun-
ishable act requires a union of actus reus and mens rea. Coke inferred the
generality of his thesis from two primary cases. The first was the exemp-
tion provided in cases of theft for someone who acquired possession of an
object and then decided later to keep it. Since the act was innocent at the
time of acquisition, the subsequent criminal intent was insufficient to gen-
erate liability.55 The second case was the excuse recognized in cases of
insanity. If the mind was not culpable, then the act could not be criminally
culpable. 6 In these two different applications of the principles of actus
reus and mens rea, the terms mean different things, but I will not allow that
point to detain us here. The fact is that Coke coined a maxim that, however
ambiguous, has become a recognized truth about the criminal law.'
As an accepted truth, Coke's maxim definitely functions as a con-
stituent element of the law and as a source for further legal development. It
has as much authoritative status as any legislative declaration or case
holding. The courts will interpret legislative prescriptions in line with
Coke's maxim. They will seek to bring the details of the law into
"reflective equilibrium" with this general maxim of the criminal law.
There are other maxims that express the same kind of synthetic truths
of criminal justice. Consider these ten:
1. Every criminal offense presupposes a voluntary human act.
2. Every criminal offense includes a dimension of wrongdoing.
3. Claims of justification negate wrongdoing.
4. Every punishable act presupposes blameworthy commission
of the elements of the offense.
54. See discussion supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
55. See COKE, supra note 16, at 107.
56. See id. at 54.




5. Blameworthy commission requires at least negligent conduct
with respect to every element of the offense.
6. Intentional, knowing, and reckless actions are worse than
negligent conduct with respect to the elements of the offense.
7. Excused conduct is not blameworthy.
8. Reasonable mistakes are not blameworthy.
9. Subjective perceptions alone cannot justify conduct.
10. Self-defense is available only against unjustified attacks.
These are propositions that practitioners of criminal theory would, in
varying degrees, hold to be true and binding as principle, at least to the
same extent that Coke's maxim is binding on the criminal law. But few
of them have ever been enacted by a legislature or written into a constitu-
tion, and most of them have never been clearly articulated in the
Anglo-American case law. Nonetheless, they are just as binding as any
principles implicit in our legal practices.
These ten propositions are grounded in the criminal law as it is rou-
tinely applied in most Western legal systems. And to the extent that they
are grounded in the conventional behavior of the courts, their existence
runs against the purely philosophical mode of inquiry I considered in the
first half of this Essay. The authority for the principle is not reason alone,
but reason as recognized in the practices of the community. The binding
force of the propositions derives from the simple recognition by actors in
the legal culture that we have felt bound by the underlying principle all
along, whether we have articulated it or not.
By stressing the function of criminal theory as a source of binding
principle, we have come to a more refined understanding of the nature of
the discipline and the kind of philosophical work that enriches the effort.
The starting point should not be the writings of the great philosophers but
rather the humble, not-fully-understood work of lawyers, legislators, and
courts. From the mundane we can derive deeper truths about the principles
that drive the practice of punishing crime.
Yet the mundane is not enough. Neither Coke's maxim nor any of the
ten principles that I have proposed find validation just in the language or
decisions of the cases. The raw words and actions of practice require inter-
pretation, and the interpretative framework must rest on a justification in
political theory. Coke's maxim requiring the concurrence of actus reus and
mens rea would hardly make sense if it did not stand for an important prin-
ciple of legality. Yet it is not so clear why legality requires the temporal
union of action and intent. What would be lost, say, by defining theft to
permit a taking at one moment of time and the relevant intent at a later
time? The answer is not obvious. Explaining the principle of concurrence
requires that we ponder the foundations of the state's authority to punish
and the nature of criminal responsibility.
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Once principles are adequately grounded, they acquire normative
force in our analysis of criminal liability. They become a source of law.
But what precisely does this mean? Suppose the legislated law deviates
from a principle in a particular case? Is the principle refuted? If they were
purely synthetic or empirical propositions, of course, an empirical counter-
example would count against their continuing validity. But their appeal and
their binding force are a function both of the extent to which they are real-
ized in practice and of their intrinsic moral and logical appeal. I recognize
that some of these propositions are controversial, and though I hold all of
them to be true, many contrary voices sound in the Anglo-American lit-
erature.
These principles differ from the kinds of principles that Dworkin
analyzed in his classic essay, The Model of Rules. 8 These have not come
into the law as conventionally recognized ethical maxims-like the famous
"no one should profit from his own wrong." They derive rather, as did
Coke's maxim, from theoretical reflection and generalization from the
concrete instantiations of the principle.
Americans are loath to recognize that theoretical work of this sort-
characteristically the work of scholars and not of courts-generates max-
ims that have a binding effect upon the law. Europeans and Asians-
particularly those in the German sphere of influence-recognize that
"theory" or scholarly generalizations of principle can provide a source of
law along with legislation and case law. In these systems, theoretical
commentary is not a secondary but a primary source of law.
Americans fail to grasp the dynamic of the so-called civil law because
they fail to understand the significance of theoretical work as a source of
law. As I have attempted to show in this Essay, we also fail to understand
the way our own system of criminal law works because we have yet to
appreciate the important role of theoretical generalization as a source of
American law.
58. Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35U. Cm. L. REv. 14 (1967).
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